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Natural and technological interdependent systems have been shown to be highly vulnerable due to
cascading failures and an abrupt collapse of global connectivity under initial failure. Mitigating the
risk by partial disconnection endangers their functionality. Here we propose a systematic strategy of
selecting a minimum number of autonomous nodes that guarantee a smooth transition in robustness.
Our method which is based on betweenness is tested on various examples including the famous 2003
electrical blackout of Italy. We show that, with this strategy, the necessary number of autonomous
nodes can be reduced by a factor of five compared to a random choice. We also find that the
transition to abrupt collapse follows tricritical scaling characterized by a set of exponents which is
independent on the protection strategy.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 64.60.ah, 89.75.Da, 89.75.Fb
Interconnected complex networks are ubiquitous in to-
days world. They control infrastructures of modern so-
ciety (energy-communication-transportation), the finan-
cial system or even the human body [1–3]. Unfortunately,
they are much more fragile than uncoupled networks as
recently recognized through the finding that the robust-
ness changes from a second order transition in uncoupled
systems to first order in interdependent systems [4–6].
The obvious mitigation strategy consists in partially de-
coupling the networks by the creation of autonomous
nodes [7]. Too much disconnection however risks en-
dangering the functionality of the system. The question
which we will address here is how to reduce fragility with-
out losing functionality and we will in fact answer this
question by developing an explicit algorithm based on be-
tweenness that enables to avoid the abrupt collapse with
a minimum number of autonomous nodes.
Buldyrev et al. [4] proposed a percolation framework
to study two coupled networks, A and B, where each A-
node is coupled to a B-node, via bi-directional links, such
that when one fails the other cannot function either. The
removal of a fraction of A-nodes may trigger a domino ef-
fect where, not only their counterparts in B fail, but all
nodes that become disconnected from the giant cluster
of both networks also fail. This causes further cascading
of failures, yielding an abrupt collapse of connectivity,
characterized by a discontinuous (first order) percolation
transition. Parshani et al. [7] showed that damage can be
mitigated by decreasing the degree of coupling, but only
if a significant fraction (≈ 0.4) of nodes is decoupled,
the transition changes from discontinuous to continuous.
The coupling is reduced by randomly selecting a fraction
of nodes to become autonomous and, therefore, indepen-
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Figure 1. The herein proposed strategy improves signifi-
cantly the resilience of the coupling between the communica-
tion system (39 stars) and the power grid (310 circles) in Italy.
The color scheme stands for the probability that the node is
inactive after the random failure of 14 communication servers.
In a) all communication servers are coupled while in b) four
servers have been decoupled following the strategy proposed
here. The coupling between the networks was established
based on the geographical location of the nodes, such that
each communication server is coupled with the closest power
station [2]. The images were produced using the software Pa-
jek.
dent on the other network. For the coupling between
power stations and communication servers, for example,
autonomous power stations have alternative communica-
tion systems which are used when the server fails and
an autonomous server has its own energy power supply.
We propose a method, based on degree and centrality, to
identify these autonomous nodes that maximize the ro-
bustness of the system in terms of connectivity. We show
that, with this scheme, the critical coupling increases,
i.e., the fraction of nodes that needs to be decoupled to
smoothen out the transition is much smaller (close to 0.1
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2Figure 2. Scheme of the cascade of node failures triggered by
the initial failure of a node in network A (top network). Two
networks, A (top) and B (bottom), are considered. When a
node initially fails in network A (a) all nodes connected to
the largest component through it also fail (b) as well as the
corresponding dependent nodes in network B (c). The failure
of the dependent nodes in network B leads to further failures
in both networks (d) and (e). For each iteration step, the
degree of coupling qx and the size of the largest connected
component Sx for each network x are listed in (f).
compared to 0.4). Significant improvement is observed
for different coupled networks including for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graphs (ER) where such improvement in the robustness
was unexpected given their narrow degree distribution.
To demonstrate the strength of our approach, in Fig. 1
we apply the proposed strategy to the real coupled sys-
tem in Italy [2] and show that by only protecting four
servers the robustness is significantly improved (details
in the figure caption).
We consider a pair of networks, A and B, where a
fraction q (degree of coupling) of A-nodes are coupled
with B-nodes. To be functional, nodes need to be con-
nected to the giant cluster of their network. When an
A-node fails, the corresponding one in B cannot function
either. Consequently, all nodes bridged to the largest
cluster through these nodes, together with their coun-
terpart in the other network, become also deactivated.
A cascade of failures occurs with drastic effects on the
global connectivity (see Fig. 2) [4, 7]. This process can
also be treated as an epidemic spreading [8]. To study
the resilience to failures, we follow the size of the largest
connected cluster of active A-nodes, under a sequence of
random irreversible attacks to network A. Notwithstand-
ing the simplicity of solely considering random attacks,
this model can be straightforwardly extended to targeted
ones [9]. Recently, for single networks, it has been pro-
posed [10] to quantify the robustness R as
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
S(Q) , (1)
where Q is the number of node failures, S(Q) the size of
the largest connected cluster in a network afterQ failures,
and N is the total number of nodes in the network [10,
11]. Here we extend this definition to coupled systems
by performing the same measurement, given by Eq. (1),
only on the network where the random failures occur,
namely, network A. To follow the cascade triggered by
the failure of a fraction 1 − p of A-nodes, similar to [7],
we solve the iterative equations,
βn = 1− qβ,n [1− SA (αn) p] , (2)
αn = p (1− qα,n [1− SB (βn−1)]) , (3)
with the initial condition α1 = p, where αn and βn are
the fraction of A and B surviving nodes at iteration step
n and Sx(χn) is the fraction of such nodes in the giant
cluster. qχ,n is the fraction of dependent nodes in net-
work χ fragmented from the largest cluster (see Methods
for further details).
RESULTS
To demonstrate our method of selecting autonomous
nodes we consider two ER graphs with average degree
〈k〉 = 4 and 10% of autonomous nodes (q = 0.1). First
we consider a method based on the degree of the node
and later we compare with the method based on the be-
tweenness. Under a sequence of random failures, the net-
works are catastrophically fragmented when close to 45%
of the nodes fail, as seen in Fig. 3. For a single ER, with
the same average degree, the global connectivity is only
lost after the failure of 75% of the nodes. Figure 3 also
shows ((green-)dotted-dashed line) the results for choos-
ing as autonomous nodes in both networks the fraction
1 − q of the nodes with the highest degree and coupling
the remaining ones at random. With this strategy, the
robustness R can be improved and the corresponding in-
crease of pc is about 40%, from close to 0.45 to close to
0.65. Also the order of the transition changes from first
to second order. Further improvement can be achieved
if additionally the coupled nodes are paired according to
their position in the ranking of degree, since interconnect-
ing similar nodes increases the global robustness [12, 13].
In the inset of Fig. 3 we see the dependence on q of the
relative robustness for the degree strategy compared to
the random case R/Rrandom. For the entire range of q
the proposed strategy is more efficient and a relative im-
provement of more than 15% is observed when still 85%
of the nodes are coupled.
Two types of technological challenges are at hand: ei-
ther a system has to be designed robust from scratch
or it already exists, constrained to a certain topology,
3Figure 3. Fraction of A-nodes in the largest connected
cluster, s, as a function of the fraction of randomly removed
nodes 1 − p from network A, for two coupled ER (average
degree 〈k〉 = 4) with 90% of the nodes connected by inter-
network links (q = 0.9). It is seen that robustness can sig-
nificantly be improved by properly selecting the autonomous
nodes. We start with two fully interconnected ER and decou-
ple 10% of their nodes according to three strategies: randomly
((black-)solid line), the ones with highest degree in network A
((red-)dotted line) and in network B ((blue-)dashed line). We
also include the case where 10% autonomous nodes in both
networks are chosen as the ones with highest degree and all the
others are interconnected randomly ((green-)dotted-dashed
line). The inset shows the dependence of the relative ro-
bustness of the degree strategy on the degree of coupling q
compared with the random case. Results for the degree have
been obtained with the formalism of generation functions (see
Methods).
but requires improved robustness. In the former case,
the best procedure is to choose as autonomous the nodes
with highest degree in each network and couple the oth-
ers based on their rank of degree. For the latter, rewiring
is usually a time-consuming and expensive process, and
the creation of new autonomous nodes may be econom-
ically more feasible. The simplest procedure consists in
choosing as autonomous both nodes connected by the
same inter-network link. However, a high degree node in
network A is not necessarily connected with a high de-
gree node in network B. In Fig. 3 we compare between
choosing the autonomous pairs based on the degree of
the node in network A or in network B. When pairs of
nodes are picked based on their rank in the network un-
der the initial failure (network A), the robustness almost
does not improve compared to choosing randomly. If, on
the other hand, network B is considered, the robustness
is significantly improved, revealing that this scheme is
more efficient. This asymmetry between A and B net-
work is due to the fact that we attack only nodes in
network A, triggering the cascade, that initially shuts
down the corresponding B-node. The degree of this B-
node is related to the number of nodes which become dis-
connected from the main cluster and consequently affect
back the network A. Therefore, the control of the degree
of vulnerable B-nodes is a key mechanism to downsize
the cascade. On the other hand, when a hub is pro-
Figure 4. Dependence of the robustness, R, on the degree of
coupling, q, for two, interconnected, (a) ER (average degree
〈k〉 = 4) and (b) SF with degree exponent γ = 2.5. Applying
our proposed strategy is applied, the optimal fraction of au-
tonomous nodes is relatively very small. Autonomous nodes
are chosen in four different ways: randomly ((blue-)triangles),
high degree ((black-)dots), high betweenness ((red-)stars),
and high k-shell ((yellow-)rhombi). The insets show the rel-
ative improvement of the robustness, for the different strate-
gies of autonomous selection compared with the random case.
Results have been averaged over 102 configurations of two
networks with 103 nodes each. For each configuration we av-
eraged over 103 sequences of random attacks.
tected in network A it can still be attacked since the
initial attack does not distinguish between autonomous
and non-autonomous nodes.
In Fig. 4(a) we compare four different criteria to select
the autonomous nodes: betweenness, degree, k-shell, and
random choice, for two coupled ER networks. In the be-
tweenness strategy, the selected autonomous are the ones
with highest betweenness. The betweenness is defined as
the number of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes
passing through the node [14]. A k-shell is obtained by
removing, iteratively, all nodes with degree smaller than
k, until all remaining nodes have degree k or larger. In
the k-shell strategy, the autonomous are chosen as the
ones with highest k-shell in the k-shell decomposition
[15]. The coupled nodes (not autonomous), for all cases,
have been randomly inter-linked. Since ER networks are
characterized by a small number of k-shells, this strategy
is even less efficient than the random strategy for some
values of q, while the improved robustness for degree and
betweenness strategies is evident compared with the ran-
dom selection. While in the random case, for q & 0.4,
a significant decrease of the robustness with q is ob-
served, in the degree and betweenness cases, the change
is smoother and only significantly drops for higher val-
4Figure 5. Dependence of the robustness, R, on the degree
of coupling, q, for two, randomly interconnected modular net-
works with 2 · 103 nodes each. The modular networks were
obtained from four Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, with 500 nodes
each and average degree five, by randomly connecting each
pair of modules with an additional link. Autonomous nodes
are selected in three different ways: randomly (blue trian-
gles), higher degree (black dots), and higher betweenness (red
stars). In the inset we see the relative enhancement of the ro-
bustness, for the second and third schemes of autonomous
selection compared with the random case. Results have been
averaged over 102 configurations and 103 sequences of random
attacks to each one.
ues of q. A maximum in the ratio R/Rrandom occurs for
q ≈ 0.85, where the relative improvement is above 12%.
Since, in random networks, many metrics are strongly
correlated [14], the results for betweenness and degree
are similar.
Many real-world systems are characterized by a degree
distribution which is scale free with a degree exponent
γ [16, 17]. In Fig. 4(b) we plot R as a function of q for
two coupled scale-free networks (SF) with 103 nodes each
and γ = 2.5. Similar to the two coupled ER, this system
is also significantly more resilient when the autonomous
nodes are selected according to the highest degree or be-
tweenness. For values of q . 0.85 the robustness is simi-
lar to that of a single network (q = 0) since the most rele-
vant nodes are decoupled. A peak in the relative robust-
ness, R/Rrandom (see inset of Fig. 4b), occurs for q ≈ 0.95
where the improvement, compared to the random case,
is almost 30%. Betweenness, degree, and k-shell, have
similar impact on the robustness since these three prop-
erties are strongly correlated for SF. From Fig. 4, we see
that, for both SF and ER, the robustness is significantly
improved by decoupling, based on the betweenness, less
than 15% of the nodes. Studying the dependence of the
robustness on the average degree of the nodes we con-
clude that for average degree larger than five, even 5%
autonomous nodes are enough to achieve more than 50%
of the maximum possible improvement.
For the cases discussed in Fig. 4, results obtained by se-
lecting autonomous nodes based on the highest degree do
not significantly differ from the ones based on the high-
est betweenness. This is due to the well known finding
that for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks, the degree
Figure 6. Dependence of the robustness, R, on the de-
gree of coupling, q, for two, randomly interconnected random
regular graphs with 8 · 103 nodes each, all with degree four.
Autonomous nodes are selected in two different ways: ran-
domly (blue triangles) and higher betweenness (red stars). In
the inset the relative enhancement of the robustness is shown
for the betweenness compared to the random case. Results
have been averaged over 102 configurations and 103 sequences
of random attacks to each one.
of a node is strongly correlated with its betweenness [14].
However, many real networks are modular, i.e., composed
of several different modules interconnected by less links,
and then nodes with higher betweenness are not, neces-
sarily, the ones with the largest degree [18]. Modularity
can be found, for example, in metabolic systems, neural
networks, social networks, or infrastructures [19–22]. In
Fig. 5 we plot the robustness for two coupled modular
networks. Each modular network was generated from a
set of four Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, of 500 nodes each and
average degree five, where an additional link was ran-
domly included between each pair of modules. For a mod-
ular network, the nodes with higher betweenness are not
necessarily the high-degree nodes but the ones bridging
the different modules. Figure 5 shows that the strategy
based on the betweenness emerges as better compared to
the high degree method.
Another example that shows that betweenness is su-
perior to degree is when we study coupled random reg-
ular graphs. In random regular graphs all nodes have
the same degree and are connected randomly. Figure 6
shows the dependence of the robustness on the degree of
coupling, for two interconnected random regular graphs
with degree 4. The autonomous nodes are selected ran-
domly (since all degrees are the same) or following the
betweenness strategy. Though all nodes have the same
degree and the betweenness distribution is narrow, se-
lecting autonomous nodes based on the betweenness is
always more efficient than the random selection. Thus,
the above two examples suggest that betweenness is a su-
perior method to chose the autonomous nodes compared
to degree.
The vulnerability is strongly related to the degree of
coupling q. Parshani et al. [7] have analytically and nu-
merically shown that, for random coupling, at a critical
coupling q = qt, the transition changes from continuous
(for q < qt) to discontinuous (for q > qt). In Fig. 7 we see
5Figure 7. Two-parameter diagram (blue curves) of two
coupled ER (average degree 〈k〉 = 4) under random attack.
The horizontal axis is the degree of coupling q and the vertical
one is p so that 1−p is the fraction of initially removed nodes.
The size of the jump in the fraction of A-nodes in the largest
connected cluster is also included (red-dotted-dashed curve).
The dashed curve stands for a discontinuous transition while
the solid one is a critical line (continuous transition). The
two lines meet at a tricritical point (TP). Autonomous nodes
are selected based on the degree (main plot) and randomly
(inset). Results have been obtained with the formalism of
generating functions.
Figure 8. Tricritical coupling qt dependence on the average
degree 〈k〉 for two coupled ER, showing that the fraction of
autonomous nodes to smoothen out the transition is signif-
icantly reduced with the proposed strategy when compared
with the random case. Autonomous nodes are selected fol-
lowing two different strategies: randomly (red squares) and
high degree (black circles).
the two-parameter diagram (pc vs q) with the tricritical
point and the transition lines (continuous and discon-
tinuous) for the random (inset) and the degree (main)
strategies. As seen in Fig. 7, when autonomous nodes
are randomly selected, about 40% autonomous nodes are
required to soften the transition and avoid catastrophic
cascades, while following the strategy proposed here only
a relatively small amount (q > 0.9) of autonomous nodes
are needed to avoid a discontinuous collapse. Above the
tricritical point, the jump increases with the degree of
coupling, lending arguments to the paramount necessity
of an efficient strategy for autonomous selection, given
that the fraction of nodes which can be decoupled is typi-
Figure 9. Dependence of the fraction of A-nodes in the
largest connected cluster on the scaling field µp along the
direction perpendicular to the transition line at the tricritical
point. The slope is the tricritical exponent βt related with the
order parameter. Autonomous nodes in the two coupled ER
(〈k〉 = 4) have been selected randomly (red line) and following
the ranking of degree (black line).
cally limited. The dependence of qt on the average degree
〈k〉 is shown in Fig. 8. The ratio between the tricritical
coupling for degree and random strategies increases with
decreasing 〈k〉. For example, for 〈k〉 ≈ 2 the fraction of
autonomous nodes needed to soften the transition with
the random selection is six times the one for the degree
strategy.
As in Ref. [23], following the theory of Riedel and Weg-
ner [24–26], we can characterize the tricritical point. Two
relevant scaling fields are defined: one tangent (µp) and
the other perpendicular (µq) to the critical curve at the
tricritical point. In these coordinate axes the continu-
ous line is described by µp ∼ µ1/ϕtq , where the tricritical
crossover exponent ϕt = 1.00 ± 0.05 for degree and ran-
dom strategies. The tricritical order parameter exponent,
βt, can be evaluated from,
s (µp, µq = 0) ∼ µβtp , (4)
giving βt = 0.5± 0.1 for both strategies. Since these two
exponents are strategy independent (see Fig. 9), we con-
jecture that the tricritical point for degree and random
selection are in the same universality class.
DISCUSSION
Here, we propose a method to chose the autonomous
nodes in order to optimize the robustness of coupled net-
works to failures. We find the betweenness and the degree
to be the key parameters for the selection of such nodes
and we disclose the former as the most effective for mod-
ular networks. Considering the real case of the Italian
communication network coupled with the power grid, we
show in Fig. 1 that protecting only the four communica-
tion servers with highest betweenness reduces the chances
of catastrophic failures like that witnessed during the
blackout in 2003. When this strategy is implemented the
6resilience to random failures or attacks is significantly im-
proved and the fraction of autonomous nodes necessary
to change the nature of the percolation transition, from
discontinuous to continuous, is significantly reduced. We
also show that, even for networks with a narrow distribu-
tion of node degree like Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, the robust-
ness can be significantly improved by properly choosing
a small fraction of nodes to be autonomous. As a follow-
up it would be interesting to understand how correlation
between nodes, as well as dynamic processes on the net-
work, can influence the selection of autonomous nodes.
Besides, the cascade phenomena and the mitigation of
vulnerabilities on regular lattices and geographically em-
bedded networks are still open questions. It is important
to note that while we use here high betweenness and high
degree as a criterion for autonomous nodes, it is possi-
ble that other metrics will be also useful. For example,
the eigenvector component of the largest eigenvector of
the adjacency matrix (even weighted) makes a very good
candidate (see e.g. [28]).
METHODS
We consider two coupled networks, A and B, where a
fraction of 1−p A-nodes fails. The cascade of failures can
be described by the iterative equations, Eqs. (2) [4, 7],
where αn and βn are, respectively, the fraction of A and
B surviving nodes at iteration step n (not necessarily
in the largest component), and Sx(χn) (χ = α|β, x =
A|B) is the fraction of nodes in the largest component in
network x given that 1 − χ nodes have failed. This can
be calculated for coupled networks in the thermodynamic
limit (N →∞) using generating functions.
Random Protection
As proposed by Parshani et al. [7], when autonomous
nodes are randomly selected and the degree of coupling
is the same in A and B, the set of Eqs. (2) simplifies to
α1 = p,
βn = 1− q [1− SA(αn)p] , (5)
αn = p (1− q [1− SB(βn−1)]) ,
where q is the degree of coupling. The degree dis-
tribution of the networks does not change in the case
of random failures and Sx(χn) can be calculated as
Sx(χ) = 1−GPx (1− χ(1− ux)) [27], where GPx(z) is
the generating function of the degree distribution of net-
work x,
GPx(z) =
∑
k
Px(k)z
k,
and ux satisfies the transcendental equation
ux =
G′Px (1− χ(1− ux))
G′Px(1)
.
The size of the largest component in network x is given
by χSx(χ).
For ER networks GPx(y) = exp [〈k〉x (z − 1)], where〈k〉x is the average number of links in network x, and
therefore
G′Px (y)
G′Px(1)
= GPx(y).
With the above equations one can calculate the size of
the largest component in both networks at the end of the
cascade process.
Recently, Son et al. [8] proposed an equivalent scheme
based on epidemic spreading to solve the random protec-
tion case.
High Degree Protection
When autonomous nodes are selected following the
degree strategy, the fraction of dependent nodes qxn
changes with the iteration step n and the set of Eqs. 2
no longer simplifies. We divide the discussion below
into three different parts: the degree distribution, the
largest component, and the coupling (fraction of depen-
dent nodes).
The Degree Distribution
The networks A and B are characterized by their de-
gree distributions, PA(k) and PB(k), which are not nec-
essarily the same. The developed formalism applies to
any arbitrary degree distribution. We start by first split-
ting the degree distribution into two parts, the compo-
nent corresponding to the low-degree dependent nodes,
PxD(k), and the component corresponding to the high-
degree autonomous ones, PxI(k). To accomplish this, one
must determine two parameters, the maximum degree of
dependent nodes, kxm, and the fraction of nodes with de-
gree kxm that are coupled with the other network, fxm.
These two parameters can be obtained from the relations,
kxm−1∑
k=0
Px(k) < q <
kxm∑
k=0
Px(k)
and
kxm−1∑
k=0
Px(k) + fxmPx(kxm) = q,
where qx is the initial degree of coupling. One can then
write
PxD(k) =
 Px(k), k < kxmfxmPx(k), k = kxm0, k > kxm (6)
7and
PxI(k) =
 0, k < kxm(1− fxm)Px(k), k = kxmPx(k), k > kxm . (7)
In the model, a fraction of 1 − p A-nodes are ran-
domly removed. If, at iteration step n, αn nodes survive
(αn ≤ p), p(1 − qA) nodes are necessarily autonomous
and the remaining ones, αn − p(1 − qA), are dependent
nodes. One can then show that the degree distribution
of network A, under the failure of 1−αn nodes, P ′A,n(k),
is given by
P ′A,n(k) =
(
1− pαn (1− q)
q
)
PAD(k) +
p
αn
PAI(k),
while the fraction of surviving links is
pAn = αn
∑
k kP
′
A,n(k)∑
k kPA(k)
.
All the B-nodes which do not survive are dependent
and so the degree distribution at iteration n, P ′B,n(k), is
given by
P ′B,n(k) =
(
1− 1βn (1− q)
q
)
PBD(k) +
1
βn
PBI(k),
while the fraction of surviving links is
pBn = βn
∑
k kP
′
B,n(k)∑
k kPB(k)
.
The Largest Component
With the degree distribution P ′x,n(k) and the fraction
of surviving links pxn one can calculate the size of the
largest component as
Sx(χn) = 1−GP ′xn (1− pxn + pxnτxn)
= 1−
∑
k
P ′xn(k) (1− pxn + pxnτxn)k,
where τxn satisfies the self consistent equation
τxn =
G′P ′xn (1− pxn + pxnτxn)
G′P ′xn(1)
=
∑
k kP
′
xn(k) (1− pxn + pxnτxn)k−1∑
k kP
′
xn(k)
.
The coupling
To calculate the fraction qα,n (and qβ,n) one must
first calculate the degree distribution of the nodes in the
largest component. This is given by
PxG,n(k) = P
′
xn(k)
1− (1− pxn + pxnτxn)k
Sχnx(χn)
.
The fraction of nodes in the largest component that are
autonomous is then given by
qxG,n = (1− fxm)PxG,n(kxm) +
∞∑
k=kxm+1
PxG,n(k),
where the upper limit of the sum is the maximum degree
in the network, which we consider to be infinity in the
thermodynamic limit. The fraction of autonomous nodes
from the original network remaining in the largest com-
ponent is qxG,nχnSx(χn), while the total fraction of au-
tonomous nodes is given by 1− q. The fraction of nodes
disconnected from the largest component that are au-
tonomous is then given by
1− qx,n = 1− q − qxG,nχnSx(χn)
1− χnSx(χn) ,
so that the fraction of dependent nodes which have frag-
mented from the largest component is
qx,n = 1− 1− q − qxG,nχnSx(χn)
1− χnSx(χn) .
For simplicity, here we assume that kx,m and fxm are
constant and do not change during the iterative pro-
cess. In fact, this is an approximation as the degree of
the autonomous nodes is expected to change when their
neighbors fail. However, in spite of shifting the transi-
tion point, this consideration does not change the global
picture described here.
Numerical simulations
Numerical results have been obtained with the efficient
algorithm described in Ref. [29] for coupled networks.
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